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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN STATES
BROADCASTING COMPANY,
a corporation, and DAN
LACY, an individual,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No.

880192-CA

vs.
Category 14b
STERRETT NEALE and NEALE
BROADCAST ALLIANCE,
DefendantsRespondents .

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of a sale of an FM and AM radio
station in Utah County.

The facts of the case are set forth in

the Amended Brief of Appellants (plaintiffs-purchasers) and the
Brief of Respondent (defendants-sellers). This Reply Brief will
address each issue raised by the respondents.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING WITH RESPECT TO
CERTAIN ITEMS OF MISSING EQUIPMENT WAS
CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Exhibit 19 sets forth what equipment was missing.

Plain-

tiffs initial brief established that the testimony offered by

the plaintiffs with respect to many of the items on Exhibit 19
was not refuted.
Defendants

falsely

claim

that

fl

[t]he

gravamen

of

this

appeal is plaintiffs1 contention that their evidence must be
believed whenever there is a conflict," and that plaintiffs
"[argue] that the Court was required to accept [their] version
of the facts."

(Brief of Respondent at 9, 11.)

ments are untrue.
court had made

These state-

Plaintiffs acknowledged that where the trial
a considered

finding

based

upon

conflicting

evidence, this Court will not overturn those findings.

It is

because of this rule that plaintiffs have not challenged most of
the findings made by the trial court, even though plaintiffs
believe that the findings are contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence.
This Court should, however, reverse the findings of the
trial court if they are contrary to the great weight of the
evidence.

In making this determination, it is not enough if the

findings are supported a mere scintilla of admissable evidence.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

Plaintiffs'

initial brief established that several of the trial court's
findings do meet this test, in that they are contrary to the
great weight

of

the evidence.

These

findings

include

the

findings with respect to the brain, the missing and defective
equipment identified in appellants' initial brief, and the extra
payroll expense.

Although there may be some isolated shreds of

evidence which standing alone might appear to support the trial
2

court's findings with respect to these items, the evidence taken
as a whole is clearly contrary to those findings.
For example, with
tronics,

valued

citation

to

at

clear

respect

to the Ampex playback elec-

$2,000.00,

and

plaintiffs

straight-forward

established,

testimony

from

by
both

plaintiff and defense witnesses, that the equipment was missing
at the time of the sale.

Defendants attempt to challenge this

testimony by arguing as follows:
Steven Hope, General Manager of KONI after
the sale in September, 1982, testified that
the Ampex equipment was present in the
station and in working condition. (T. 19395).
George Culbertson, former owner and
station engineer, testified that the Ampex
equipment and the pre-amplifiers were in the
station when he performed an inventory in
December, 1983. (T. 277, Exh. 69). Michael
Pierce, a disk jockey at the station after
July 1, 1982, used the Ampex playback
equipment. (T. 3 02).
Brief of Respondent, pages 12-13.
Although
support

an

in isolation these statements might appear to
inference

that

the

Ampex

playback

electronics

equipment was in the station, a careful analysis shows that the
great weight of the evidence was to the contrary.
testimony on pages 193-95 of the transcript

Steven Hope's

(R. 617-19), for

example, shows that the Ampex equipment which he used was a
reel-to-reel recorder, not the Ampex playback electronics and
pre-amplifiers.

The testimony of George Culbertson set forth on

page 277 of the transcript refers to the Ampex playback electronics, but does not unequivocally state that the equipment was
there.

Mr. Culbertson later testified as follows:
3

Q. Going to the next one the tape Preamps
were not found?
A.
That is true and now those are the
Preamps that I am talking about with the
Ampex PR 10 transports.
Q.

Were not in use in any way?

A.

No.

Q.

The stereo heads were they found?

A. They had been installed in the Ampex PR
10 and I did not inspect any of them.
I
don't even know if they were still there.
R. 703-04 (emphasis added).
The testimony of Michael Pierce on page 3 02 (R. 727) of the
transcript can only be read as referring to the Ampex reel-toreel recorder or another recorder, because the Ampex playback
electronics were not in use.

(R. 702; Ex. 17 (marked with an

asterisk indicating "not in use11).)
Similarly, with respect to the noise and distortion meter,
defendants claim that Mr. Neale testified that the noise and
distortion meter was in the station, and cite to page 562 (R.
989) of the transcript.
follows:

Mr. Nealefs testimony is transcribed as

"The noise and distortion meter I do know about."

This appears to be a transcription error because the sentence
makes sense in the context of the paragraph only if Mr. Neale
stated "the noise and distortion meter I do not know about."
Even if the transcription is correct, the sentence does not
state that the noise and distortion meter was in the station,
but only that Mr. Neale "knew about it."

4

Plaintiffs1

initial

brief

oscilloscopes was missing.
"Mr.

Crawford

recalled

showed

that

one

of

the

Defendants countered by stating that

oscilloscopes

in

two

locations, the

transmitter room and the transmitter site on the mountain.
478)"

Brief

two

of Respondent

at

13.

Mr.

Crawford's

(T.

actual

testimony from page 478 (R. 905), however, is as follows:
This was a small fairly inexpensive
oscilloscope.
I think there were two of
those. It was at least one. I remember one
in the transmitter room and another one up
on the mountain but I can't remember for
sure whether it was one or two.
Mr. Lacy unequivocally testified that the items set forth
on Exhibit 19 were not present in the station when he purchased
it.

The "evidence" cited by defendants in their brief does not

contradict Mr. Lacy's testimony.

Under these circumstances, the

Court should hold that the great weight of the evidence is
contrary to the findings of the trial court.
POINT II
NEALE BROADCAST WARRANTED THAT THE
EQUIPMENT WOULD BE IN "GOOD REPAIR AND
WORKING ORDER," NOT JUST THAT THE
EQUIPMENT WOULD BE "USABLE."
Point II of defendants' brief addresses plaintiffs' claim
that the brain and two of the carrousels were inoperable, and
challenges plaintiffs' argument concerning
warranty applicable to those items.

the scope of the

Plaintiffs established in

their initial brief that the Asset Purchase Agreement contained
two separate warranties: (1) all of the transmitting and studio
equipment

(the

first

three

categories
5

on

Schedule

2) were

warranted to be in good repair and working order, regardless of
whether the equipment was in active use, and

(2) all other

assets listed on Schedule 2 (comprising the personal property)
were warranted to be in good repair and working order if in
active use.

Defendants do not challenge this interpretation of

the contract, and indeed no other interpretation is possible.
Defendants1 only response is a claim that the argument is raised
for the first time on appeal.
Contrary

to

Neale

Broadcast's

assertion, however,

this

construction of the Agreement was, and continues to be, the
heart of plaintiffs1 complaint against Neale Broadcast.

From

the beginning, plaintiffs have maintained that Neale Broadcast
breached the warranty provided in paragraph 4.2.3 by failing to
transfer the assets listed in paragraph 2.1.1 in good repair and
working order.

In their Complaint, for example, plaintiffs

alleged that Neale Broadcast breached "paragraph 4.2.3 of the
Asset Purchase Agreement [at] the closing date of said agreement."

(Complaint, R. 1-2, paragraph 5.)

Moreover, plaintiffs'

counsel made a distinction between the warranty with respect to
the personal property as compared with the studio and transmitting equipment in opening argument:
Paragraph 4.2.3 of the contract states as of the
closing date all of the personal property listed in
schedule 2 which is presently in the active use in the
operation of the stations will be in good repair and
working order unless otherwise noted on schedule 2.
The transmitting and studio equipment for the stations
which are [sic] in good repair and working order.
R. 442-43 (paragraph structure omitted).
6

This is the very distinction that plaintiffs argue on this
appeal, and merely because Neale Broadcast has not perceived
this subtle, yet critical, distinction until now does not mean
that plaintiffs have just raised the argument for the first
time.
Plaintiffs

acknowledge

that

they

have

presented

their

arguments on appeal in a slightly different fashion than they
had been presented before the trial court.
improper, however, in so doing.

There is nothing

An appeal to this Court should

not be limited to merely resubmitting the arguments in the same
fashion in which they were submitted to the trial court.

With

the benefit of hindsight and having had an opportunity to read
the transcript and to thoroughly consider why the trial court
was not persuaded by the arguments, a party is expected on
appeal to restructure its arguments and present them in a more
persuasive fashion than was done below.
With the benefit of such hindsight and reflection, it is
now apparent that both the trial court and defendants failed to
properly understand the nature of the warranty contained in the
Asset

Purchase Agreement.

Defendants

argue

on appeal, for

example, that the trial court erred in finding that the warranty
was breached with respect to the brain and two of the carrousels, claiming the brain and carrousels were "in use" at the
time of the sale.
not relevant.

Whether the items were "in use," however, is

The Asset Purchase Agreement required that the

studio and transmitting equipment be in "good repair and working
7

order".

The fact is that the brain and carrousels did not work.

For the reasons set forth in plaintiffs1

initial brief,

plaintiffs are entitled to an additional offset for the value of
the cartel, the Magnecord recorder, and one additional carousel.
These items were listed on Schedule 2 as being included in the
purchase, but were not in good repair and working order at the
time of the transfer.1
Defendants further claim that the trial court's findings
with respect to the brain and carrousels were not supported by
the evidence.

Defendants do not challenge the evidence cited in

plaintiffsf initial brief to the effect that there were numerous
problems with the brain and carrousels, but only claim that the
equipment was in some form of "use11 at the time of the transfer.
For the reasons set forth above, the fact of "use" is irrelevant
to the issue of whether the equipment was in good repair and
working order.

Plaintiffs' initial brief sets forth substantial

evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the brain and

defendants claim on page 16 of their brief that the cartel
was in regular daily use up until the time of the transfer. As
set forth above, the fact of daily use is not equivalent to
"good repair and working order.u In addition, the portions of
the records cited by defendants do not refer specifically to the
cartel, but only to the automation equipment generally.
Plaintiffs demonstrated in their initial brief that the only
record references specifically to the cartel established that
the cartel was not in good repair and working order at the time
of the transfer.
8

carrousels were not in good repair and working order,2 and that
finding should be affirmed.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR
THE COST OF REPLACEMENT OF THE BRAIN.
Point III of respondents' brief begins by rearguing the
same issue addressed in Point II, i.e., the brain was used after
the sale, therefore its condition did not breach the warranty
set forth in the Asset Purchase Agreement.

Plaintiffs have

refuted that contention in Point II of this Reply Brief.

That

equipment can be coaxed and cajoled into some form of limited
use does not mean that it is "usable" nor that it is in "good
repair and working order."

In any event, there was ample

evidence that the brain did not work sufficiently

to auto-

matically run the station, which was what it was designed to do.
The second part of Point III of respondents' brief responds
to plaintiffs' claim for the full replacement cost of the brain.
Plaintiffs' initial brief asserted that there was no evidence to
support the trial court's finding that it would cost $3,000.00

I
2

For example, Exhibits 12, 13, 14, and 15 detail ongoing
complaints and comments from employees describing the problems
they experienced with the brain. Exhibit 15, signed by Malcolm
Crawford, stated that "the automation has died R.I.P." Exhibit
70, which is a letter by George Culbertson, a former owner and
an expert called by the defendants, observed destruction and
disposition of station equipment and maintenance by good
technicians who were not experienced, "repairs with 'chewing
gum, rubber bands and hair pins'", unwise modifications,
unauthorized experimentation by non-technical people, theft by
employees and unauthorized removal of station equipment, and
this was the condition of the station purchased by the plaintiff.
9

to repair the brain, and argued that plaintiffs were entitled to
an offset for the full replacement cost of the brain because the
brain was not repairable.
The trial court found that the Control Design brain was not
in good repair and working order, and awarded plaintiffs a
$3,000.00 offset, representing the supposed cost of repair of
Plaintiffs1 initial brief challenged that finding,

the brain.

claiming there was no evidentiary support for the figure of
$3,000.00, and also asserting that there was no evidence that
the brain could be repaired.
Defendants responded to this argument by asserting that
Exhibit 68 provided evidentiary foundation for the trial court's
finding as to repair cost.

Brief of Respondent at 22.

Exhibit

68, however, is a letter criticizing certain technical tests
performed

on

the

radio

station,

and

does

not

necessity of nor cost of repair to the brain.
that defendants intended to refer to Exhibit 10.

address

the

It is believed
Exhibit 10 is

a proof of performance test which was offered into evidence for
the purpose of showing that the station did not meet Federal
Communications Commission regulations.
offered

as

evidence

of

the

cost

of

(R. 479-82.)
repair

of

It was not
the brain.

Defendants, however, apparently reply on the following statement
contained in Exhibit 10:
Brain will not work at all.
Brain is
missing cards. Amount of effort needed to
repair cannot be determined at this time.
Will probably require $2,000-$3,000 in labor
by an engineer experienced with the equipment, plus approx. $200-$400 in parts on
10

carrousels
brain.

and

an unknown

amount

on

the

Even if this statement had been offered as evidence of the
cost of repair, it would not have been admissible.

There was no

foundation showing that the persons who prepared the report had
any knowledge concerning the cost of repairing similar equipment.

More

importantly, the quoted

statement

affirmatively

states that the cost of repair cannot be determined.

It was

error for the trial court to rely on such avowedly inadmissible
and speculative statements.
Plaintiffs1 burden of proof was to establish that the brain
was not in good repair and working order, and to provide proof
of at least one of the possible measures of damages.
Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987).

Ault v.

If defendants disagreed

with the measure of damages selected by plaintiffs, the burden
was on defendants to provide proof of that alternative measure
of damages.
In

Id.

compliance

with

their

burden

of

proof,

plaintiffs

presented admissible evidence that the brain was not repairable,3 and presented evidence that the cost of replacement of
the brain was $13,104.05.

(T. 72, 189.)

Defendants contest

defendants assert that "defendant is unaware of any
evidence that the control brain was irreparable, only that Mr.
Culbertson had been unable to repair it.11 (Brief of Respondent
at page 21.)
The distinction is specious.
Mr. Culbertson
testified that he, working together with a trained factory
representative, had been unable to repair the brain.
If the
factory representative and Mr. Culbertson were unable to repair
the brain, the only reasonable conclusion is that it was not
repairable.
11

this argument, claiming that cost of replacement

is not an

appropriate measure of damages for damaged or destroyed items of
property, citing as support the same case cited by plaintiffs in
their initial brief, Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App.
1987) .
Ault
property

involved
located

claims of damage to sentimental

in an old home which had been used

residence for delinquent boys.
awarded

damages

personal
as a

The plaintiffs-owners had been

against the defendant-renter

for damages to

trees, window glass, oak tables, and other similar items.

The

defendant

the

appealed

from

the

judgment,

asserting

that

plaintiffs had only put on evidence of replacement cost, rather
than lost value.
In response to the defendant's contentions in Ault, this
Court noted that "[f]or personal property, such as the destroyed
oak tables, damages are ordinarily based on market value at the
time of taking or destruction."
omitted).

586 P.2d at 1121 (citation

This Court further noted, however, that "cost of

replacement may have been the only evidence available for the
jury

in determining the fair market value of the destroyed

items."

739 P.2d at 1121-22.

Finally, this Court stated in

footnote as follows:
Dubois [the defendant-renter], whose
main attack throughout his discussion of the
damage question is that loss of value rather
than repair cost should apply, specifically
argues that even insofar as repair cost
might be germane, the Aults actually^focused
on replacement cost rather than repair cost.
Our review suggests that much of the
12

replacement cost evidence was indistinguishable from evidence of repair cost.
For
example, a shattered window or a broken pipe
is repaired by being replace. Replacement
cost was clearly proper as to the dead
trees, since the only way to effect restoration of dead trees is to plant new ones.
It is in the context of the damaged
or destroyed items of personal property
where evidence of replacement cost seems
least appropriate, especially since many of
the items were old, worn, or otherwise
marginal to begin with, and the date of
damage or destruction was unknown. . . .
739 P.2d at 1122 n.7 (emphasis in original).
Defendants in the instant case cite to the above footnote
from Ault to support their argument that it would have been
error for the trial court to award damages for the cost of
replacing the brain.

Defendants apparently claim that the brain

was "old, worn, or otherwise marginal," and argue that replacement cost was therefore not an appropriate measure of damages.
Defendants1 argument is misplaced for two reasons.

First,

defendants had warranted that the brain was in good repair and
working order.

The fact that the brain was in a damaged or

inoperable condition was the very thing which was warranted
against.

Whether the brain was old was therefore irrelevant—

defendants had guaranteed that it would be in good repair and
working order.

No such warranty existed in Ault.

Second, the evidence before the trial court established,
without contradiction, that electronic equipment such as the
brain did not materially depreciate, and that the current fair

13

market value of a used brain was the same as the replacement
cost,

(T. 69-72.)
In summary, there is no admissible evidence to support the

Court's finding that the brain was repairable at the price of
$3,000.00, or at any other price.

The uncontradicted evidence

before the court established that the brain was not repairable.
Plaintiffs were entitled to an offset for the fair market value
of the brain, which in this particular instance is the same as
the replacement cost of the brain.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE
EXTRA PAYROLL EXPENSE INCURRED BY REASON
OF THE INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE BRAIN.
In response to plaintiffs1 evidence and argument that they
were entitled to the $3,355.07 in extra payroll expense incurred
by reason of the inoperable condition of the brain, defendants
argue that plaintiffs1 "decision to operate the radio station
manually rather than by automation was determined by choice,
rather than by necessity."

(Brief of Respondent at page 22.)

Defendants cite to testimony that the automation equipment was
actually used, and also to testimony that at least one disk
jockey preferred to work live.
Defendants also claim that the evidence would have supported a finding that the automation equipment worked and was
used to keep KONI on the air.

Brief of Respondent at 23.

fact

a

is, however,

that

such

finding would

have

The

squarely

contradicted the trial court's finding that the brain was not in
14

good repair and working order.

The trial court discounted the

testimony concerning the use of the brain, and found that the
brain was not in good repair and working order.
Even if the brain had been "usable" in some sense of the
word, the testimony established that it still required constant
supervision.

It did not work with that degree of reliability

necessary for the operation of a radio station with only minimal
human supervision.
it would work.

It did not work as it was represented that

The brain would not control the various pieces

of equipment and machines it was designed to do.

Judge Park

ruled that the brain did not work, therefore, the plaintiffs
should be compensated for that value.

The equipment not working

is set forth on Exhibit 20.
With respect to the contention that at least one disk
jockey preferred to work live, is irrelevant because he had no
voice.
an

The equipment would not work.

order

from

Federal

The plaintiffs were under

Communications

Commission

to

divest

themselves of one station and not to actively operate two AM
stations which serve the same broadcast area.
Where the trial court found that the warranty was
breached with respect to the brain, it was error to fail to
allow an offset for all damages flowing from that breach.

The

trial court found that the brain was not in good repair and
working order, and it follows that the extra payroll expense was
necessary and not merely a matter of choice on the part of
plaintiffs.
15

POINT V
THE AWARD OF COMPOUND INTEREST WAS IMPROPER.
Plaintiffs tendered the sum of the $89,587.16 into court on
May 9, 1983.
complaint.

This was tendered in connection with filing of the
The plaintiffs were permitted to withdraw the check

for $89,587.16 and in exchange paid the sum of $59,587.16 on May
27,

1983,

to

the

defendants

$30,000.00 with the court.

and

redeposited

the

sum

of

Because that tender exceeded the

amount then due, no award of interest should have been made.
The point is that a tender was made on May 9, 1983, or at the
latest the tender was made on May 27, 1983.

This changes by

thousands of dollars the math that is calculated in a handwritten document attached to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon which the ultimate judgment was entered.
The law is set forth in 23 Am.Jur.2d Deposits in Court § 7
(1983) :

"It has been held that a debtor who deposits money in

court pursuant to law is not, as a general rule, liable for
interest on the fund during the time that it is in the court's
custody

. . . ."

See also Potter v. Gardner, 3 0 U.S. 718

(1831); Himlev v. Rote, 9 U.S. 313 (1809).
The Wyoming court in the case of Graves v. Burch, 2 6 Wyo.
192, 181 P. 354, 360 (1919) held that
not be required to pay

lf

[t]he defendants should

interest upon the amount originally

tendered and deposited in court . . . . M
An examination of the handwritten document attached to the
judge's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon which
16

judgment was granted clearly shows that the calculations are
wrong.

Judge Park held

that a credit

should be given of

$6,000.00.

Monthly payments were to be made at the rate of

$1,122.36.

This would amount to almost five months of payments.

The handwritten document shows that a credit was given but immediately interest is compounded monthly beginning with July 31,
1982.

If the credit had been properly given as set forth by the

judge assuming there was a delinquency, arguendo, there would be
a credit at least until February of 1983.4

The court has

allowed for interest to be compounded before there is even a
delinquency therefore the defendants have had the use of the
money plus now they are claiming it on a monthly basis.

The

defendants were ordered in paragraph 27 of the Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

of

Law

to

recalculate

the

balance

of

the

promissory note after giving credit for $6,000.00 and this was
not

done

accurately

because

this

would

payments for which no credit was given.

constitute

monthly

In the memorandum

decision of Judge Park, paragraph 27, the court concludes that
if there was less than $3 0,000.00 due on the promissory note as
4

Plaintiffs received an offset of $6,000.00, plus made
payments of $2,403.30 and $1,201.65, for a total of $9,604.95.
Attached to this brief as Appendix MA" is an amortization
showing that the offset and payments were the equivalent of
eight regular payments, or through February, 1983.
Interest
should therefore not have been compounded, even under the trial
court's rationale, until after February, 1983.
The attached
Appendix MBfl shows the amortization with compounding commencing
after February, 1983.
The error in the computations is even more pronounced when
credit is given for the value of the brain and carrousels, as
shown on the attached Appendix ,fCff.
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of January 5, 1984 then the plaintiffs shall be given a credit
for such overpayment together with interest at the rate of 10%
per annum.

By not including interest as a delinquency when a

credit should have been given, there would be no judgment in
favor of the defendants.
The trial court found that the amount owing at the time of
plaintiffs1 tender in connection with filing their complaint was
$89,216.93.

(R. 323.)

Because that tender exceeded the amount

then due, no award of interest should have been made.
The

defendants

rely

Liechtenstein, 45 Utah

upon

the

320, 145 P.

case

1036

of

Jensen

(Utah 1915).

v.
The

language in the promissory note in the Jensen case is not the
language in the promissory note that this Court is called upon
to interpret.

The promissory note in the case now before the

Court states that interest will be paid at 10% per annum.

The

trial court interpreted this to mean compounding interest on a
monthly basis.
Jensen

This was not provided for in the note.

promissory

Therefore,

it

interpretation.

note

provided

is understandable
For

the

for

quarterly

why the

reasons

set

Court

forth

The

payments.

reached

this

in plaintiffs1

initial brief, it was error to compound interest on a monthly
basis where the note provided for annual simple interest.
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POINT VI
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE PLAINTIFFS WERE
THE PREVAILING PARTIES.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys fees
because they received the net judgment.

This argument ignores

the fact that the trial court only ordered plaintiffs to pay
amounts which had been previously deposited with the court.
These amounts had been tendered into court by personal check at
the inception of the action, and later replaced with certified
funds.
Defendants further argue that they have an absolute right
to attorneys fees under the terms of the promissory note and the
individual guaranty.

Although defendants did file a counter-

claim and asserted that plaintiffs had breached the terms of the
promissory

note,

the

bulk

of

the

litigation

in

this

case

concerned plaintiffs' claim to an offset under the terms of the
Asset

Purchase

Agreement.

Defendants'

attorneys

fees

were

predominately incurred in defense of plaintiffs' claims under
the Asset Purchase Agreement.

Under the terms of that Agree-

ment, attorneys fees are allowed only to the prevailing party.
Under the law stated in plaintiffs' initial brief and under that
stated in respondents' brief, plaintiffs must be considered the
prevailing party on the issues relating to the Asset Purchase
Agreement.

The

award

of

attorneys

fees to

defense of that action should be disallowed.
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defendants

for

In any event, the fees awarded to defendants were more than
double the fees awarded to plaintiffs, and were clearly unreasonable.
Defendants

further

claim

that

they

are

entitled

to an

additional award of fees, to include everything after the fees
were calculated by the trial court.
claim for the reasons set forth above.

Plaintiffs dispute this
In the event, however,

that this Court determines that an award of additional attorneys
fees is appropriate, those fees should not include any work
performed prior to the date of the judgment, such as preparation
of the proposed finds of fact and conclusions of law or the
written closing arguments.

The judgment must be deemed to have

comprehended all matters occurring prior to the date thereof.
POINT VII
ANY JUDGMENT ON REMAND SHOULD BE
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST STERRETT NEALE PERSONALLY.
Plaintiffs

established

in their

initial brief

that the

trial court erred in release the funds on deposit to Sterrett
Neale, personally, without allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to
respond to defendants1 motion for an amendment of the judgment.
Defendants respond by arguing that the time for response to the
motion was governed by Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, and
that plaintiffs1 response was untimely when measured by the time
parameters of that rule.

Defendants also argue that the trial

court's action merely corrected a clerical error.
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The fallacy with defendants1 argument is that defendants
did hot proceed under Rule 2.9.

Rule 2.9 governs the submission

of proposed orders and judgments after the court has already
ruled that the party is entitled to the order or judgment.

In

this case, the trial court had already ruled, but had also
already entered a judgment.

Defendants then sought to amend

that judgment to change the payee and to add a social security
number.

Whereas Rule 2.9 should have governed the proceedings

after the court had ruled on defendants1 motion to amend, the
rule should have had no application prior to the trial court
ruling on the motion.
Defendants elected to seek an amendment of the judgment by
motion.

Having elected that procedure, defendants and the court

should have followed the rules governing responses to motions,
particularly Rule 2.8.

Plaintiffs1 initial brief established,

and defendants do not dispute, that plaintiffs made a timely
response in accordance with Rule 2.8.
The defendants filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 2.8 and then
proceeded pursuant to Rule 2.9.
The
undone.
spent.

action

of the

trial

court

unfortunately

cannot be

The money has already been disbursed, and probably
Equity demands, however, that where the money was paid

to Sterrett Neale, any judgment on remand should be enforceable
against Mr. Neale to the extent of the funds he received.
Plaintiffs were awarded judgment against defendants in an
amount of $8,088.75 but yet the defendants were not required to
21

post any bond.

The defendants were allowed to take the money

out of the court contrary to Rule 2.8.

Plaintiffs are now in a

position where Neale Broadcast Alliance is no longer a viable
corporation and Sterrett Neale has been dismissed from the case
but was allowed to take the money personally from the court.
For these reasons a bond should be posted by the defendants and
judgment should be rendered against Sterrett Neale personally.
CONCLUSION
The findings of the trial court with respect to certain
items were contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

The

trial court's findings were further conflicting, in that the
court found that the brain did not function properly and thus
breached

the warranty

in the Asset

Purchase Agreement,

but

failed to award the damages, including extra payroll expense,
flowing from that breach.
No interest should have been awarded where the plaintiffs
had tendered the amount due into court, and the interest should
not have been compounded monthly.

The defendants should not be

awarded interest until the credits and offsets were properly
accounted for.

There is over $9,000.00 that should be accounted

for before interest would be due.
The attorneys fees awarded to defendants were unreasonable,
and

should

not have been allowed where plaintiffs were the

prevailing party on the predominate cause of action.
Finally,

any

judgment

on

remand

should

be

enforceable

against Sterrett Neale personally, where he was the recipient of
22

funds which were improperly released by the trial court.

The

plaintiffs have an unsatisfied judgment of over $8,000.00.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and
this

case

remanded

for entry

of

judgment

for the

cost of

replacement of the brain and the other items as detailed in
plaintiffs' initial brief, and for the extra payroll expense, or
in the alternative, for a new trial.
DATED this 31st day of May, 1988.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
31st day of May, 1988.
Stephen L. Henriod
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX "A"

MOUNTAIN 8TATES BROADCASTING CORPORATION
VS
NEALLE BROADCAST ALLIANCE
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Court ordered *6,300.00 offset
ORISINAL AMOUNT OF LOANi
MONTHLY PAYMENTi
INTEREST RATE

7 - 198£
8 - 1982
9 - 1982
10 - 1982
11 - 1982
12 - 1982
-

*1201.63
10 %

1983
1983
1983
1983
1983

TERM OF LOAN

757.75
754.05
750.32
746.56
742.77
738.94
735.09
731.20
727.28
733.34
197,20
(8 days interest)

Principal

Balance

443.90
447.60
451.33
455.09
458.88
462.71

90466.09
90038.49
89587.16
89132.07
88673.19
88210.48

466.56
470.45

87743.92
87273.47
88000.75
88734.09
SS931.J29

89587.16

5-9-83

12© Month*

(Compounded Monthly in Default)

Interest

Date

1
£
3
4
5

*90,9£9.99

(

655.87 >

ANNUAL INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT OF NOTE by Mountain Stat<
Broadcasting Corporation at 10* per annum
To 5-9-84
To 5-9-85
To 5-9-86
To 2-24-87

65.59
72.15
79.36
69.84

( 721.46
< 793.61
( 872.97
< 942.81

)
)
)
)

AF P E N D I X "B"

I*

5ruFn!'!

OjY!n£TT7C.TTr>!\{

ORIGINAL
MONTHLY

JADCASTING CORPORATION
VS
NEALLE BROADCAST ALLIANCE

AMCL'vT
3AN

PAYI»

INTEREST

RATE

in default)

IOC'J!"

Date

Interest

6
7

Pr* -ici pal

Ba i ancEi

6000.00

84929.99
85637.74
86345.49
870S3.24
87760.99
85357. 69
86065.44
84863.79
85570. 99

787.73
707.73
707.75
707.75

8-1*
9 - i9ee
la - i9a2
13 - 1982
11 - 1982
12-1-1982
12 - 1982

2403.30
1201.65
707.20

1 - IJJJ

2 - 1983
3 - 1983
4 - 198.3
5

120 Months

•• 1 <JM ,1

'

707.20
707.20
724.88
730.92
198.58
J
ay» irf»' "»i' )

86278^19
86985. 39
87710.27

88441.19
88637.75
o9387.16

5-9-83

(

949.41 )

ANNUAL INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT OF NOTE by Mountain States
Broadcasting Corporation at 10% par annum
To
To
To
To

5-9-84
5-9-85
5-9-86
2-24-87

94.94
104.44
114.88
101.85

I .444. 35 )
: 148.79 )
563.67 )

•v. *.- )

APPENDIX " C: "

MOUNTAIM ', I,. 11 "< i BHGADCPS!ING l.'UHPfJMhi I I LIN

VS
NEAL.L.E BROADCAST ALLIANCE
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Offaet * 3,030.00 f-ji- Car-ouaeLs
and Offset * 13,104.126 for Automation Pr'iin
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF LOAN«
MONTHLY PAYMENTi
INTEREST RATE
Date

*90,9S9.99

*1201.65
10 %

(Coi

TFRM OF LOAN
I

Interest

7 - 1982
8 - 1982
9 - 1982
10 - 1982
11 - 1982
12 - 1982

757.73
734. 03
730.32
746.36
742.77
738.94

12fl I'Vih

HI ' In Uolaulti
1

bu J » w t

443.90
447.60
451.33
455.09
43d.88
468.71

90486. 09
90038.49
89387.16
89132.07
86673.19
88210. 48

466.36
87743.92
733. 09
470.45
87273. 47
731.20
474.37
727.28
86799. 10
723.33
478.32
86320. 78
128.64
86192.-14
191.84
(8 day» principal and interest)
5-9-83
89387.16
( 3395.02 >
5-9-83 Remainder of offset
7372.03
C 10767.05 )

1
2
3
4
S

-

1983
1983
1983
1983
1983

ANNUAL INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENT OF NOTE oy Mountain Stati
Broadcasting Corporation at 10% per annum
To
To
To
To

5-9-84
5-9-85
3-9-86
2-24-87

1076.71
1184.36
1302.81
1158.18

(
(
<
'

11843.76 )
13028.14 )
14330.95 )
J
:3489. 13 )

